As James Madison famously said, "if men were angels, no government would be necessary," (Federalist #51). The founding father also said, in Federalist #10, that "No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity." And to think Madison wrote all this before the discovery of modern genetics and the advent of evolutionary biology.
Why are those two disciplines relevant? Unless you are a creationist, you must acknowledge that mankind is the result of billions of years of evolution. And the singular quality of all those billions and billions and billions of creatures that stayed alive long enough to reproduce is selfishness--the biological imperative to wrest from the environment the resources necessary for survival. That imperative is still with us today to some degree. Certainly the selfish impulse varies from individual to individual (just as other traits vary genetically from individual to individual), but it still lurks inside each and everyone of us. You may like to think of yourself as a caring and altruistic person and you may very well be, but for a moment, imagine someone takes your food, your shelter, and your mate. Feel that rise of indignation? That's selfishness.
Given the desire we all have to protect our own interests, the need for oversight in government is indispensable. An individual who blindly trusted others would never have the requisite selfishness to survive long enough to pass along his or her genes. Such an individual would quickly be exploited out of existence by all the far more efficient selfish genes around it. President's Bush's refusal to allow his staff to testify under oath thus strikes at the very essence of our nature and it is no wonder that so many feel a sense of offense at his actions.
The system of checks and balances devised by our founding fathers is an attempt, albeit somewhat imperfect, of defeating the inherent selfishness of individuals. Perhaps all government actions should be viewed with the presumption that those in power are first and foremost trying to benefit themselves.
Friday, March 23, 2007
Tuesday, March 20, 2007
Response To 'Animal Advocate'
Animal Advocate wrote:
Your question seems to regard the social contract. Does our social contract value protecting the majority (national security) over the minority (right to a fair trial) or vice versa? It seems throughout American history, protection of the majority has been preferred during times of war. No doubt this administration abuses the power that comes with the threat of war. But if we take your hypothetical state of four people as a representation of the current American public, one could argue that yes, indeed those two people would agree to imprison the third in the name of "national security." Or maybe the pendulum has finally drifted too far in that direction and protection of civil liberties has resurfaced. This amorphous entity called the state has been given the power to protect us from the state of nature, and rational people would disagree about whether that means protecting the many or protecting the few in anticipation of members of the many becoming members of the few in the future.
Political Philosopher responds:
The hypothetical situation described did not recognize an explicit social contract, but did imply one. However, the issue is not protection of the "majority(national security)" versus protection of the "minority." The question was more of what is the extent of the state's power to protect its members. Would a rational person agree to a social contract in which the few in power had the right to circumvent or disregard the rule of law at their discretion? That seems like a risky contract to enter into, even if one does not reasonably expect to be one of the unfortunate individuals victimized by such a decision. The nature of the example was meant to show that on some level, the state is nothing more than an individual or collection of individuals. Locke believes that civil society is necessary to prevent every man from being his own judge in matters needing redress. "And this puts Men out of a State of Nature into that of a Commonwealth, by setting up a Judge on Earth, with Authority to determine all the Controversies...that may happen to any Member of the Commonwealth (Second Treatise on Government, Ch. VII, paragraph 89). But what person would surrender this power if it were to be subject not to agreed upon laws but to the whims and the desires of the judge?
Your question seems to regard the social contract. Does our social contract value protecting the majority (national security) over the minority (right to a fair trial) or vice versa? It seems throughout American history, protection of the majority has been preferred during times of war. No doubt this administration abuses the power that comes with the threat of war. But if we take your hypothetical state of four people as a representation of the current American public, one could argue that yes, indeed those two people would agree to imprison the third in the name of "national security." Or maybe the pendulum has finally drifted too far in that direction and protection of civil liberties has resurfaced. This amorphous entity called the state has been given the power to protect us from the state of nature, and rational people would disagree about whether that means protecting the many or protecting the few in anticipation of members of the many becoming members of the few in the future.
Political Philosopher responds:
The hypothetical situation described did not recognize an explicit social contract, but did imply one. However, the issue is not protection of the "majority(national security)" versus protection of the "minority." The question was more of what is the extent of the state's power to protect its members. Would a rational person agree to a social contract in which the few in power had the right to circumvent or disregard the rule of law at their discretion? That seems like a risky contract to enter into, even if one does not reasonably expect to be one of the unfortunate individuals victimized by such a decision. The nature of the example was meant to show that on some level, the state is nothing more than an individual or collection of individuals. Locke believes that civil society is necessary to prevent every man from being his own judge in matters needing redress. "And this puts Men out of a State of Nature into that of a Commonwealth, by setting up a Judge on Earth, with Authority to determine all the Controversies...that may happen to any Member of the Commonwealth (Second Treatise on Government, Ch. VII, paragraph 89). But what person would surrender this power if it were to be subject not to agreed upon laws but to the whims and the desires of the judge?
Sunday, March 11, 2007
The State and The Individual
A New York Times editorial on March 10th details the recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to throw out a suit by Khaled el-Masri. El-Masri, a German citizen, claims he was arrested and sent to Afghanistan, where he was allegedly tortured. He brought suit against the CIA, charging violations of both the Constitution and international law. The judges of the Fourth Circuit however, ruled that the "very subject matter" of the case made it too secret to move forward.
This decision brings about an interesting question concerning the relationship between the state and the individual. Depending on your philosophical background, you may have a different view of what constitutes the state, but I favor an atomistic view. The state, in this view, is merely a collection of individuals. There is a certain convenience in saying 'the state's interests' or 'the state's well-being' but this is a linguistic nicety, not a logical position. The state can have no interests or motivations beyond those of the individuals that make it up.
What the Fourth Circuit has basically ruled, then, is that in certain matters, the interests, rights, and motivations of one individual (or individuals) trump the interests, rights, and motivations of another. This view is the antithesis of "rule by law not men", for it implies that all are not equal before the law. Or, to put it another way, the court has effectively stated that in some cases, laws may be violated on the basis of what one group of people has decided to be important or necessary for the rest. This logic has troubling consequences. Imagine a state composed of four people. One of the citizens comprises the government and the other three are non-government members. Would it be desirable to have the member of the government declare that one of other citizens must be imprisoned and tortured for the good of the state--which is nothing more than the good of the four individuals that comprise it? Surely the citizen chosen to be tortured would not find the action for the good of the state, for he is a member of the state. And if the other two citizens consent, they must do so with the understanding that at some point, it may be in the interests of the state to imprison them. Governments that operate in accord with the principle of 'acting in the good of the state regardless of law' are effectively arbitrary.
Certainly this is not to say that all information members of the government are privy to should be made available to all citizens. However, there must be some way for individuals to seek redress when the government acts in an arbitrary way contrary to law.
This decision brings about an interesting question concerning the relationship between the state and the individual. Depending on your philosophical background, you may have a different view of what constitutes the state, but I favor an atomistic view. The state, in this view, is merely a collection of individuals. There is a certain convenience in saying 'the state's interests' or 'the state's well-being' but this is a linguistic nicety, not a logical position. The state can have no interests or motivations beyond those of the individuals that make it up.
What the Fourth Circuit has basically ruled, then, is that in certain matters, the interests, rights, and motivations of one individual (or individuals) trump the interests, rights, and motivations of another. This view is the antithesis of "rule by law not men", for it implies that all are not equal before the law. Or, to put it another way, the court has effectively stated that in some cases, laws may be violated on the basis of what one group of people has decided to be important or necessary for the rest. This logic has troubling consequences. Imagine a state composed of four people. One of the citizens comprises the government and the other three are non-government members. Would it be desirable to have the member of the government declare that one of other citizens must be imprisoned and tortured for the good of the state--which is nothing more than the good of the four individuals that comprise it? Surely the citizen chosen to be tortured would not find the action for the good of the state, for he is a member of the state. And if the other two citizens consent, they must do so with the understanding that at some point, it may be in the interests of the state to imprison them. Governments that operate in accord with the principle of 'acting in the good of the state regardless of law' are effectively arbitrary.
Certainly this is not to say that all information members of the government are privy to should be made available to all citizens. However, there must be some way for individuals to seek redress when the government acts in an arbitrary way contrary to law.
Thursday, March 1, 2007
McCain, Obama, and the word 'wasted'
On Wednesday's edition of the Late Show with David Letterman, Arizona Republican and future presidential candidate John McCain stated, "Americans are very frustrated, and they have every right to be. We've wasted a lot of our most precious treasure, which is American lives." McCain's use of the word 'wasted' recalled a similar statement from Illinois Democrat and declared presidential candidate Barack Obama, who in a speech said, "We ended up launching a war that should have never been authorized, and should have never been waged, and on which we've now spent $400 billion, and have seen over 3,000 lives of the bravest young Americans wasted." The uproar surrounding both comments was immediate. "Senator McCain should apologize immediately for his callous comments," opined Karen Finney, a DNC spokeswoman. After taking "heat" from both Democratic and Republican elements, Obama recanted by stating, "Their sacrifices are never wasted." McCain quickly offered his own mea culpa.
"I should have used the word, sacrificed, as I have in the past. No one appreciates and honors more than I do the selfless patriotism of American servicemen and women in the Iraq War."
However strident and sincere these subsequent apologies may be, one must ask whether the choice of the word 'wasted' is used inappropriately in these contexts and thus requires an apology. The American Heritage dictionary defines 'to waste' as to "use, consume, spend, or expend thoughtlessly or carelessly," while Merriam Webster offers the similar "to spend or use carelessly." Certainly no one likes to think of a human life being wasted, but we use this expression all the time in our daily lives--the addict or the criminal has wasted his life, we observe, with little thought of an obligation to apologize for our statements. Of course, in order to use the word waste in these cases, there must be some idea of what 'thoughtlessly' or 'carelessly' implies. Can an individual who has thought through his actions, however objectionable or detrimental they may be, be said to have wasted his life? 'Carelessly' presents a similar problem, as it variously means 'indifferent, unconcerned, unvalued' and 'negligent.' If an individual is indifferent towards his own well-being, has he wasted his life? Answering yes to these questions would seem to indicate that the word 'waste' functions in the same way as other value judgment words; that is, the observer can be the one charged with making the determination of the quality, much like one can say that a certain natural phenomona is 'breathtaking' or that a particular poem is 'stilted,' (This is not meant to imply that only the observer can make these value judgments, simply that it is within the accepted use of the word to do so). It seems that when using the word 'wasted,' a crucial question is from whose vantage point the determination is made.
Of course, one might note that it is improper to equate the concept of a 'wasted life' with the value judgment placed on an object, as with a 'breathtaking sunset,' even though both 'wasted' and 'breathtaking' are serving the same grammatical function. The major difference, lies, it would appear, in the ascription of responsibility. Who or what, in these cases, is responsible for attaching a particular value/quality to an object? In the case of a 'breathtaking sunset', it may be argued that the responsibility for the word breathtaking lies both with the observer and the object. The sunset, through its intrinsic qualities, presents itself in a certain way to the observer, who because of his particular value system, adjudges it 'breathtaking.' In the same way, the 'stilted poem' is a function of both the creator of the poem and its reader. Translating this discussion to the use of the word 'wasted' presents a problem, though, because people are different from sunsets and poems (we will address the obvious difference between a natural object and a created or designed object in due time). Saying that a soldier's life has been wasted is different from saying that the soldier wasted his life. The first statement implies an agent or an actor to perform the wasting, while the second statement implies the individual himself brought about the condition. Looking at the second statement, we see we have the same problem of vantage point introduced earlier. Who makes the determination--has the responsibility-for attaching the adjective 'wasted' to the soldier's life? If the soldier has properly thought through his actions and is not indifferent to his life, then he would be remiss to ascribe the term 'waste' to his life. That means the responsibility for the term 'waste' lies solely with the observer, who is free to make whatever value judgment he sees fit and others are of course free to agree or disagree. Of course, were the soldier to agree that he wasted his life, then the discussion would be moot since it would appear that his own perspective would be the most applicable one from which to make such a judgement.
The first statement, which is more relevant to the situations referred to by Senators McCain and Obama, presents an even greater difficulty for now there are at least three perspectives to consider: the agent who deployed the soldier, the soldier, and the observer (obviously the agent is an observer as well. The distinction is both for convenience and for the purposes of the discussion). Taking the agent's perspective first, it is debatable whether President Bush deployed the troops 'thoughtlessly' or 'carelessly.' Clearly some thought and some care went into the decision to go to war and the plan for executing it. Whether the amount of thought and care was adequate to the task is somewhat irrelevant to the discussion; surely President Bush believed the degree of forethought put into the plan was sufficient, so from his perspective he would not use the term 'wasted' in concert with the soldiers' lives. The soldier's position on the use of the word wasted is somewhat different from the discussion above because in this situation, the soldier is acting according the dictates of the agent's plan. His judgement of whether his life has been wasted would have to be made based on his judgement of the soundness and value of the plan he is being charged to execute. Certainly some soldiers have expressed their opposition to the war in Iraq, either overtly or covertly, and perhaps some of them would agree that their lives were wasted in Iraq. And it is also certain that a fair amount of soldiers do agree with the president's mission in Iraq; presumably these soldiers would not use the term wasted to describe their sacrifice. That leaves us once again with the judgment of the observer. But the crucial difference now is that the judgment here is not whether the soldiers' lives were wastes (as in something internal to the soldiers' lives is partly responsible for the use of the term), but whether their lives were wasted--meaning the actions of the agent cause the application of the adjective.
From this vantage point, it is clear that we are no longer discussing the soldiers as individuals with lives and dreams and goals. Instead, we are looking at the soldiers as the means to a particular policy end. This brings to mind Kant's famous injunction to see people only as ends and never as means. It may be argued that in the discussion of 'waste' above, the examples of the sunset and the drunk and the criminal all treat the objects of the adjective 'waste' as ends. The only considerations in deciding to use the term were the qualities inherent to the object and the perspective of the observer. But in the context of the Iraq War, the soldiers are most certainly a means. Returning to an earlier example, it would be mistaken to say that the 'stilted poem' was described as such due to the inherent qualities of the poem since the poem would have no inherent qualities without the agency of its author. It would, however, be apt to state that the poem was 'stilted' due to the decisions of its creator. Thus, the poem is not an end in this case, but the means by which the author expresses himself. Saying the poem is 'stilted' is actually saying the 'author created this particular poem in a fashion that I would describe as stilted.' Similarly, saying the soldiers' lives were wasted is not saying the 'soldiers wasted their lives,' but is instead saying something to the effect of 'President Bush is wasting the soldiers lives by using them as the means in a hopeless situation.' Viewed from this vantage point, it can be seen that the negative connotations of the word 'waste' apply to the ends that President Bush is pursuing, not the means--the soldiers--by which he is trying to achieve them. And it can also be seen that McCain's and Obama's use of the term 'waste' was merely a value judgement to which everyone is entitled. Thus, no apologies were necessary or even appropriate.
"I should have used the word, sacrificed, as I have in the past. No one appreciates and honors more than I do the selfless patriotism of American servicemen and women in the Iraq War."
However strident and sincere these subsequent apologies may be, one must ask whether the choice of the word 'wasted' is used inappropriately in these contexts and thus requires an apology. The American Heritage dictionary defines 'to waste' as to "use, consume, spend, or expend thoughtlessly or carelessly," while Merriam Webster offers the similar "to spend or use carelessly." Certainly no one likes to think of a human life being wasted, but we use this expression all the time in our daily lives--the addict or the criminal has wasted his life, we observe, with little thought of an obligation to apologize for our statements. Of course, in order to use the word waste in these cases, there must be some idea of what 'thoughtlessly' or 'carelessly' implies. Can an individual who has thought through his actions, however objectionable or detrimental they may be, be said to have wasted his life? 'Carelessly' presents a similar problem, as it variously means 'indifferent, unconcerned, unvalued' and 'negligent.' If an individual is indifferent towards his own well-being, has he wasted his life? Answering yes to these questions would seem to indicate that the word 'waste' functions in the same way as other value judgment words; that is, the observer can be the one charged with making the determination of the quality, much like one can say that a certain natural phenomona is 'breathtaking' or that a particular poem is 'stilted,' (This is not meant to imply that only the observer can make these value judgments, simply that it is within the accepted use of the word to do so). It seems that when using the word 'wasted,' a crucial question is from whose vantage point the determination is made.
Of course, one might note that it is improper to equate the concept of a 'wasted life' with the value judgment placed on an object, as with a 'breathtaking sunset,' even though both 'wasted' and 'breathtaking' are serving the same grammatical function. The major difference, lies, it would appear, in the ascription of responsibility. Who or what, in these cases, is responsible for attaching a particular value/quality to an object? In the case of a 'breathtaking sunset', it may be argued that the responsibility for the word breathtaking lies both with the observer and the object. The sunset, through its intrinsic qualities, presents itself in a certain way to the observer, who because of his particular value system, adjudges it 'breathtaking.' In the same way, the 'stilted poem' is a function of both the creator of the poem and its reader. Translating this discussion to the use of the word 'wasted' presents a problem, though, because people are different from sunsets and poems (we will address the obvious difference between a natural object and a created or designed object in due time). Saying that a soldier's life has been wasted is different from saying that the soldier wasted his life. The first statement implies an agent or an actor to perform the wasting, while the second statement implies the individual himself brought about the condition. Looking at the second statement, we see we have the same problem of vantage point introduced earlier. Who makes the determination--has the responsibility-for attaching the adjective 'wasted' to the soldier's life? If the soldier has properly thought through his actions and is not indifferent to his life, then he would be remiss to ascribe the term 'waste' to his life. That means the responsibility for the term 'waste' lies solely with the observer, who is free to make whatever value judgment he sees fit and others are of course free to agree or disagree. Of course, were the soldier to agree that he wasted his life, then the discussion would be moot since it would appear that his own perspective would be the most applicable one from which to make such a judgement.
The first statement, which is more relevant to the situations referred to by Senators McCain and Obama, presents an even greater difficulty for now there are at least three perspectives to consider: the agent who deployed the soldier, the soldier, and the observer (obviously the agent is an observer as well. The distinction is both for convenience and for the purposes of the discussion). Taking the agent's perspective first, it is debatable whether President Bush deployed the troops 'thoughtlessly' or 'carelessly.' Clearly some thought and some care went into the decision to go to war and the plan for executing it. Whether the amount of thought and care was adequate to the task is somewhat irrelevant to the discussion; surely President Bush believed the degree of forethought put into the plan was sufficient, so from his perspective he would not use the term 'wasted' in concert with the soldiers' lives. The soldier's position on the use of the word wasted is somewhat different from the discussion above because in this situation, the soldier is acting according the dictates of the agent's plan. His judgement of whether his life has been wasted would have to be made based on his judgement of the soundness and value of the plan he is being charged to execute. Certainly some soldiers have expressed their opposition to the war in Iraq, either overtly or covertly, and perhaps some of them would agree that their lives were wasted in Iraq. And it is also certain that a fair amount of soldiers do agree with the president's mission in Iraq; presumably these soldiers would not use the term wasted to describe their sacrifice. That leaves us once again with the judgment of the observer. But the crucial difference now is that the judgment here is not whether the soldiers' lives were wastes (as in something internal to the soldiers' lives is partly responsible for the use of the term), but whether their lives were wasted--meaning the actions of the agent cause the application of the adjective.
From this vantage point, it is clear that we are no longer discussing the soldiers as individuals with lives and dreams and goals. Instead, we are looking at the soldiers as the means to a particular policy end. This brings to mind Kant's famous injunction to see people only as ends and never as means. It may be argued that in the discussion of 'waste' above, the examples of the sunset and the drunk and the criminal all treat the objects of the adjective 'waste' as ends. The only considerations in deciding to use the term were the qualities inherent to the object and the perspective of the observer. But in the context of the Iraq War, the soldiers are most certainly a means. Returning to an earlier example, it would be mistaken to say that the 'stilted poem' was described as such due to the inherent qualities of the poem since the poem would have no inherent qualities without the agency of its author. It would, however, be apt to state that the poem was 'stilted' due to the decisions of its creator. Thus, the poem is not an end in this case, but the means by which the author expresses himself. Saying the poem is 'stilted' is actually saying the 'author created this particular poem in a fashion that I would describe as stilted.' Similarly, saying the soldiers' lives were wasted is not saying the 'soldiers wasted their lives,' but is instead saying something to the effect of 'President Bush is wasting the soldiers lives by using them as the means in a hopeless situation.' Viewed from this vantage point, it can be seen that the negative connotations of the word 'waste' apply to the ends that President Bush is pursuing, not the means--the soldiers--by which he is trying to achieve them. And it can also be seen that McCain's and Obama's use of the term 'waste' was merely a value judgement to which everyone is entitled. Thus, no apologies were necessary or even appropriate.
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